GRANTED IN PART: September 8, 1994 GSBCA 12871-C(12700-P) STANLEY COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC., Protester, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Respondent. Gerald N. Gordon and Charles J. Malaret of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Los Angeles, CA, counsel for Protester. William P. McGinnies and Marc J. Weinberger, Office of the Chief Counsel, United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), HYATT, and GOODMAN. DANIELS, Board Judge. Stanley Computer Systems, Inc. (Stanley), having prevailed in a protest against the award by the Treasury Department's United States Customs Service (Customs) of a contract for data entry services, has moved the Board to award protester the costs of filing and pursuing the case. Stanley initially sought reimbursement of $120,251.88 -- $109,071 in attorney fees and $11,180.88 in disbursements. Protester later amended its request to include the cost of deposition and hearing transcripts, $5,028.30. Customs had no objection to an award of the bulk of this amount. The agency opposed award of $33,716.10, however, maintaining that Stanley should not be reimbursed for three categories of counsel's work: (1) efforts associated with unsuccessful counts, (2) work which did not appear to have been performed, and (3) time which was not reasonably expended. In response, Stanley decreased its request by $8,794.50, to $116,485.68. Because of transposition of digits and incorrect addition, the figures used by the parties and cited above do not precisely match the documentation submitted. Summing the individual items involved, we find that Stanley's amended motion sought an award of $125,547.52 ($109,071 in attorney fees and $16,476.52 in disbursements); Customs challenged items totalling $34,062.10 ($33,440.50 in attorney fees and $621.60 in disbursements); and in response to this opposition, Stanley reduced its request by $8,802.50 to $116,745.02 ($100,268.50 in attorney fees and $16,476.52 in disbursements). $25,259.60 ($24,638 in attorney fees and $621.60 in disbursements) remains in dispute. Discussion Whenever the Board "determines that a challenged agency action violates a statute or regulation or the conditions of any delegation of procurement authority [regarding automatic data processing equipment]," it may "further declare an appropriate interested party to be entitled to the costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorney's fees." 40 U.S.C. 759(f)(5)(B), (C) (1988). In Stanley Computer Systems, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, GSBCA 12700-P, 94-2 BCA 26,715, 1994 BPD 34, relief from decision granted, 1994 BPD 42 (Feb. 23, 1994), aff'd on reconsideration, 1994 BPD 57 (Mar. 10, 1994), we determined that challenged agency actions violated provisions of statute and regulation. As Customs concedes, Stanley is an appropriate interested party to recover its costs of filing and pursuing that protest because it was the prevailing party in the case -- it succeeded on the significant issue it pursued to decision and achieved the benefit it sought in bringing the suit. See Bedford Computer Corp., GSBCA 9837-C(9742-P), 89-2 BCA 21,827, at 109,811, 1989 BPD 121, at 3. The objective of the statute authorizing cost awards is to make each prevailing party whole "from pursuing its protest so long as the fees and costs it seeks to recover are reasonable." United States v. Compusearch Software Systems, 936 F.2d 564, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The parties agree that Stanley has shown that in prosecuting this protest it reasonably incurred costs of $75,630.50 in attorney fees and $15,854.92 in disbursements (courier service, computerized legal research, document duplication, witness fees, costs of counsel's travel, and deposition and hearing transcripts), and has acceptably documented these costs. We have independently reviewed these costs, and the documentation of them, and expressly find that the parties' conclusion is correct. We consequently order that the Government make Stanley whole by reimbursing it for those costs. 40 U.S.C. 759(f)(5)(C) (1988). In the remainder of this opinion, we consider whether the contested amounts meet the standard set forth in Compusearch. 1. During the course of the protest, Stanley made six allegations of improper agency action. By the time of the Board's hearing, protester had abandoned two of these counts and had stated that it did not object to our granting Government motions which disposed of the other three. Customs asks us to deny reimbursement for costs incurred in pursuit of the five unsuccessful counts. The amount involved is $10,746.60. Following Supreme Court guidance, the Board has held on numerous occasions that where a protester prevails on only some of its counts, and those on which it is unsuccessful are distinct and readily severable from the ones on the basis of which the protest was granted, reimbursement will not be made for expenses incurred in pursuing the unsuccessful counts. Government Technology Services, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, GSBCA 12277-C (12041-P), 1994 BPD 128, at 7-8 (June 21, 1994), and cases cited therein. The parties disagree as to whether the Board should order that Stanley be reimbursed for fees charged by the firm's attorneys for time described in five journal entries, as well as the costs of two transcripts of depositions of agency officials. We agree with Customs that each of these items involved in part the counts which were distinct and readily severable from the principal one. Stanley has persuaded us that most of the amounts are appropriately reimbursable, however. For three of the journal entries, Stanley's counsel has made allocations of time which reduce the amount sought to that said to be related only to the successful count. Counsel's notations of work performed on the days in question persuade us that two of the allocations are reasonable. Notations involving the third day in question, as to which $1,500 is contested, indicate that a deduction should be made because the work was wholly associated with the unsuccessful counts. The other two journal entries involve counsel's travel to Washington, D.C., to conduct depositions. Although a fraction of the depositions appears to have involved the peripheral grounds of protest, the travel was clearly necessary for depositions on the principal ground, and counsel has explained in an affidavit that he billed for less time than he might have for those two days. We award full reimbursement for attorney fees incurred for those days. As to the deposition transcripts, Stanley maintains, without contest from Customs, that the depositions involved issues related to both successful and unsuccessful counts, and that the basic purpose of the sessions was to learn information related to the principal issue. We award Stanley the entire cost of the transcripts. 2. Customs asks us to deduct $4,130 for attorney fees associated with work on days on which, according to counsel's journal entries, an attorney drafted and revised written discovery requests to be sent to the agency. Customs maintains, and Stanley does not deny, that such discovery requests were never sent. Stanley's rejoinder is that the entries show that on the same days, counsel drafted and revised similar requests to be sent to the awardee, and those requests were actually transmitted. This is not really an answer as much as an admission that the agency is correct. The entries show that many tasks were performed on the days in question, however, so a deduction of the fees for the entire days' work would be inappropriate. We subtract from the time assertedly devoted to the case on those days the time which appears to have been associated with preparation of the requests to the agency. This results in a disallowance of $1,200 in costs for which reimbursement is sought. 3. The law firm Stanley engaged to represent it in this protest assigned one partner and one associate to the case. Customs notes that for numerous days, one or all of the associate's journal entries for work performed include the statement "conferred re status of bid protest." The agency urges us to deny reimbursement for the associate's fees for each of these days -- a total of $5,103. Stanley maintains in response that these billing entries, which involved general strategy discussions between the partner and the associate or instructions for work to be accomplished, involved brief amounts of time and were frequently accompanied by several other tasks performed by the associate. We agree with Stanley that brief conferences between a partner and an associate are integral to an incisive approach to a protest and to a coordinated, economical division of work to be done by lawyers on the case. No cause exists to make the requested deduction. 4. The Board authorized the filing of reply briefs, limited to ten pages in length, in the underlying protest. Stanley filed two such briefs. The Board sustained Customs' objection to these filings and authorized Stanley to refile a single reply brief of not more than ten pages. Protester complied with this order. Customs now asks that we deny reimbursement of $5,280 in attorney fees associated with the drafting of the two initial reply briefs -- or alternatively, reduce the total amount of the award because counsel devoted excessive time to the writing of the reply briefs. Stanley contends that no reduction is appropriate because the research and writing which went into the briefs would have been performed whether the two initial submissions had been consolidated into one either before or after the Board's order. When an agency contends that a protester's cost application seeks reimbursement of fees charged for excessive attorney time, the Board considers whether the amount of time devoted to the particular tasks in question was reasonably expended. Integrated Systems Group, Inc. v. National Aeronautics & Space Administration, GSBCA 12679-C(12603-P), 94-2 BCA 26,668, 1994 BPD 19, and cases cited therein. Here, counsel's journal entries indicate that between 17.1 and 24.9 hours were spent preparing Stanley's reply to briefs filed by Customs and the intervenor which supported the agency. (The specific number is not known because on one of the days in question, counsel worked on numerous matters, only one of which was reply briefs.) In light of the legal and factual complexity of the issues addressed in the reply, and the limitations on the amount of time and pages available for the filing, we agree with Customs that Stanley's counsel spent an excessive amount of time on this matter. We deduct $1,500 from the amount sought. Thus, from the $25,259.60 in costs which is in dispute, we conclude that an award of all but $4,200 is appropriate. Decision Stanley's motion for an award of costs incurred in filing and pursuing the protest is GRANTED IN PART. We hold that protester reasonably expended $112,545.02 ($96,068.50 in attorney fees and $16,476.52 in disbursements) in filing and pursuing the underlying protest. We award that amount to Stanley. This sum shall be paid, without interest, from the permanent indefinite judgment fund, 31 U.S.C. 1304 (1988). 40 U.S.C. 759(f)(5)(C) (1988). _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge We concur: _________________________ _________________________ CATHERINE B. HYATT ALLAN H. GOODMAN Board Judge Board Judge