REQUEST FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME DENIED: March 3, 1994 GSBCA 12709-P-R TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT GROUP, INC., Protester, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Respondent, and DULLES NETWORKING ASSOCIATES, INC., Intervenor. John A. McEwan, President of Technology Advancement Group, Inc., Chantilly, VA, appearing for Protester. Donald S. Safford, Office of General Counsel, Naval Regional Contracting Center Detachment, Long Beach, CA; and Anita M. LeBlanc, Office of General Counsel, Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, VA, counsel for Respondent. B. David Whitehead, Vice President of Dulles Networking Associates, Inc., Sterling, VA, appearing for Intervenor. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), NEILL, and GOODMAN. DANIELS, Board Judge. On February 24, 1994, protester moved for reconsideration of the Board's decision in this protest. The motion was denied as untimely filed. Technology Advancement Group, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, GSBCA 12709-P-R (Feb. 25, 1994). On February 28, protester asked for an enlargement of time in which to file the motion for reconsideration. Protester wishes that we retroactively deem its motion for reconsideration timely, so that the motion might be considered on the merits. Under the Board's rules of procedure, with specified exceptions, "for good cause shown, the Board may enlarge any time prescribed." "An enlargement of time may be granted even though the request was filed after the time for taking the required action expired, but the party requesting the enlargement must show good cause for its inability to make the request before that time expired." Rule 2(b) (58 Fed. Reg. 69246, 69251 (Dec. 30, 1993) (to be codified at 48 CFR 6101.2(b)). Protester cites the following reasons as purported good cause for enlarging the time for the filing of the motion for reconsideration: (1) Rule 32(c), governing the timeliness of motions for reconsideration, was confusing in the form in which it existed until January 3, 1994. (2) The Board's rules of procedure, including Rule 32(c), were changed while the protest was pending, but a copy of the new rules was not sent to protester. (3) The presiding judge has not responded to telephone calls from protester's president. Because we consider protester's request for an enlargement of time to be in effect a motion for reconsideration of our latest dismissal, the entire panel of judges to which the case is assigned is ruling on the request. We deny the request. None of the reasons cited constitutes good cause for enlarging time in the way desired by protester. The procurement protest system was established by Congress as "a strong enforcement mechanism . . . to insure that the mandate for competition is enforced and that vendors wrongly excluded from competing for government contracts receive equitable relief." H.R. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1435 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2110, 2123). In creating the process, however, Congress was also concerned that procurements not be unduly disrupted and contract performance not be irresponsibly interrupted. Id. at 1431, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2119. Thus, the statute is "designed to strike a balance between the competing demands of permitting protest actions to support the integrity of the federal procurement system, on the one hand, and allowing agencies to acquire goods and services which they need within a reasonable amount of time, on the other." Xerox Corp., GSBCA 9862-P, 89-2 BCA 21,652, at 108,922, 1989 BPD 68, at 19. The Board's rules of procedure are crafted with the intent of preserving the designed balance of the statute. An untimely pleading is inevitably prejudicial to the Government and vendors who are participants in a procurement. Xerox Corp., 89-2 BCA at 108,922, 1989 BPD 68 at 19. These parties are entitled to know with some certainty when procurements may continue without further threat of litigation. Julie Research Laboratories, Inc., GSBCA 9387-P-R, 88-2 BCA 20,776, 1988 BPD 84. As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has cautioned, "It has long been established that government officials must follow their own regulations, even if they were not compelled to have them at all." Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d 776, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We have followed this maxim in adhering strictly to our timeliness rules with regard to motions for reconsideration. Storage Technology Corp., GSBCA 9345-P-R, 88-3 BCA 20,967, at 105,958, 1988 BPD 134, at 2. This is not to imply that the Board is excessively formalistic. Congress intended that although we are to be "courtlike," our proceedings should be "more informal and expeditious and less expensive [than] comparable proceedings in the courts." S. Rep. No. 1118, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 25 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5259; see also 41 U.S.C. 607(e) (1988). Toward that end, the Board regularly makes itself available for telephonic conferences with parties to cases. In this protest, for example, we held five separate conferences, most of them lasting well over an hour, so that the parties could present their positions and respond to each other's quickly; the alternative would have been to direct the filing of innumerable pleadings and responses. In addition, we went to extraordinary efforts on two occasions to remedy protester's failure to make clear its challenges to the protested procurement, so as to speed the case toward a resolution on the merits. First, after respondent's counsel properly observed that the protester filed an unfocused group of papers, instead of a complaint (see Rule 7(b)(2)), the Board organized protester's allegations into a proper complaint. Later, the Board sorted through a mass of supplemental charges made by protester, organizing them so that the parties could address them in a coherent manner. The presiding judge also made himself available to protester's president to explain basic mechanics of how a protest is handled by the Board, such as by describing how a hearing is organized. The Board made clear to the parties, however, that in striving to make our proceedings more informal and expeditious, but less expensive, than a court's, we will not sacrifice another of Congress' goals for this institution -- that the Board be independent, impartial, and objective. See S. Rep. No. 95-1118 at 2, 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5236, 5247. For that reason, the Board does not allow ex parte communications between judges and party representatives of the sort that is generally prohibited between judges and attorneys. Thus, we do not permit communications between party representatives and Board judges which concern the merits of a case, or which might even have the appearance of concerning the merits of a case. See, e.g., Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:801-05 (1992). Although we permit corporate parties to appear by their officers or authorized employees, Rule 6(a)(1), we expect those non-attorney representatives to conduct themselves in accordance with the limitations on attorneys' contacts with the Board. In this case, the presiding judge ceased communications with protester's president when he determined that the latter desired to speak about matters which might appear to concern the merits of the litigation. We also expect that parties appearing before the Board, whether by counsel or not, will have a basic familiarity with our rules of procedure before coming here (or will at least gain such an understanding shortly after filing). Those rules are published in the Code of Federal Regulations and are consequently readily accessible. The current rule on timeliness of motions for reconsideration clearly specifies when such motions may be made. Protester apparently believed when it filed its motion that the timeliness of that motion was governed by the previous rule, 48 CFR 6101.32(c) (1993). The old rule is clear as well. It provided that a motion for reconsideration "shall be filed . . . in a protest within 10 days after the date of receipt by the moving party of the decision or order." Former Rule 2(c) provided that with specified exceptions, "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is 7 days or more, intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and federal holidays shall be counted." These two rules, taken together, clearly state that a motion for reconsideration of a protest decision shall be filed within 10 calendar days after the moving party's receipt of the decision. Under either set of rules, as we have already held, protester's motion was late. If protester desired a greater length of time in which to file a motion, it should have asked for an enlargement of time in advance, rather than after the motion was dismissed. Order Protester is now in effect asking us to expose the Government to continuing liability because protester allegedly did not understand the rules. This is an inequitable result which we do not further. The request for an enlargement of time in which to file the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge We concur: _________________________ _________________________ EDWIN B. NEILL ALLAN H. GOODMAN Board Judge Board Judge