DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: January 28, 1993 GSBCA 12249-P RMTC SYSTEMS, INC., Protester, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Respondent, and UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS, INC., Intervenor. Jeff Stollman, President of RMTC Systems, Inc., Boulder, CO, appearing for Protester. Col. Gregory E. Smith, George W. Griffith, and Capt. Jacqueline J. Jackson, Office of the Chief Attorney, Defense Supply Service-Washington, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Keith W. Griffen, Vice President of University Systems, Inc., Portland, OR, and Satish Attawar, Sr. Vice President of University Systems, Inc., Milpitas, CA, appearing for Intervenor. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), HENDLEY, and NEILL. DANIELS, Board Judge. RMTC Systems, Inc., protests that the Department of the Army's award to University Systems, Inc., of a contract for the supply of laptop computers was in error. The alleged problem is that the computers offered by the awardee do not meet one of the mandatory specifications, that they be "FCC Class B certified and capable of passing an FCC inspection." The Army has moved to dismiss the protest for lack of jurisdiction. The agency contends that RMTC is not an interested party to bring the protest because it was eliminated from the competitive range for the procurement months before the case was filed. The awardee, which has intervened in the protest, supports the motion. Protester opposes it. We grant the motion. Background The Defense Supply Service-Washington issued the subject solicitation on June 2, 1992. Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit 1. On August 24, 1992, the contracting officer informed RMTC that its -- proposal no longer has a reasonable chance of being selected for contract award. This determination was made after a thorough evaluation of your technical proposal. . . . Therefore, . . . your proposal has been determined unacceptable and a revision of your proposal will not be considered. Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit 3. The agency did not provide RMTC with any specific reasons for its decision. It said only: The general rationale is as follows: Your offer lacks essential information to substantiate data presented. To raise the evaluation to an acceptable level would require extensive clarification and corrections. The clarifications are material and upgrading the proposal to a clearly acceptable level would require major revisions or additions. Id. On August 31, RMTC acknowledged receipt of this letter and asked for "a detailed debriefing of the reasons for this determination at the earliest possible time." Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit 4. The protest was filed on January 7, 1993. On January 13 or 14, RMTC received a debriefing. At that time, it was given specific reasons for its exclusion from the competitive range. On January 22, RMTC amended its protest to allege that on the basis of information it learned at the debriefing, it believed that the agency's reasons were incorrect and that the proposal should have been retained in the competitive range. Discussion We have already decided a case which is on all fours with this one. In Trimble Navigation, Ltd. v. Department of Transportation, GSBCA 11692-P, 1992 BPD 62 (Feb. 26, 1992), as here, the protester was eliminated from the competitive range because its proposal was found to be technically unacceptable. By way of explanation of the rejection, the protester was given only "a generic notice that could be used for an entirely different procurement without being reworded." The firm filed its protest several weeks later. We held that the protester was not an interested party because it had failed to make a timely challenge to its elimination from the competitive range. We said in Trimble: [T]he pertinent inquiry is whether protester had sufficient notice of an adverse agency action to trigger the timeliness requirements for filing a protest. We hold that . . . where an offeror is told it has been excluded from the competitive range because its proposal is technically unacceptable, the offeror has received sufficient notification of an adverse agency action and must file its protest within ten working days of such notification. 1992 BPD 62, at 5. Having failed to make such a filing, the protester no longer has a direct economic interest in the award of the contract, and is consequently not an interested party to bring a protest against that award. 40 U.S.C. 759(f)(1), (9)(B) (1988). We explained further: Once a party has failed to file a timely protest regarding its rejection from the competitive range, it can become an interested party for purposes of appearing before the Board with regard to the same procurement only if another firm files a timely protest which, if granted, would negate the reasons given for excluding the first party from the competitive range. 1992 BPD 62, at 3-4 (quoting Berkshire Computer Products, GSBCA 11539-P, 92-1 BCA 24,587, at 122,685, 1991 BPD 302, at 3). RMTC asks us to find its protest timely because the additional allegation contained in the January 22 amendment was filed within ten days of the date on which the firm was debriefed. In this regard, it relies on Tandem Computers, Inc., 65 Comp. Gen. 490 (1986), 86-1 CPD 362, and Marine Hydraulics International, Inc., B-219683, 85-2 CPD 602 (Nov. 26, 1985). Both of these cases are inapposite; they involve the timeliness of protests, after debriefing, of award decisions brought by firms which had been in the competitive range. As we explained in Trimble, we require a firm which has been removed from that range to protest promptly, even before debriefing, because the alternative -- could severely prejudice the procurement process by potentially requiring agencies to redo months of negotiations and evaluations should such a protester prevail. Such a system would prejudice other vendors as well and unnecessarily prolong -- at additional expense -- the procurement process in contravention of the Brooks Act's stated support for the "goals of economic and efficient procurement." 40 U.S.C. 759(f)(5)(A) (1988). 1992 BPD 62, at 6-7. Decision The Army's motion is GRANTED. The protest is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. As a result of this ruling, (1) we do not reach RMTC's motion for summary relief and (2) our order of January 14 suspending the Army's authority to proceed with contract performance lapses. _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge We concur: _________________________ _________________________ JAMES W. HENDLEY EDWIN B. NEILL Board Judge Board Judge