________________________________________________________ DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART; DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN PART: September 16, 1992 _________________________________________________________ GSBCA 11862 VAN NESS ASSOCIATES, LTD., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Richard I. Deringer, General Partner, Van Ness Associates, Ltd., A California Limited Partnership, San Francisco, California, appearing for Appellant. Martin A. Hom and Gerald Schrader, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges PARKER, HYATT, and WILLIAMS. PARKER, Board Judge. Van Ness Associates, Ltd., appellant, has appealed the General Services Administration's assessment of $104,682.83 in overpayments on a lease. Appellant also claims respondent owes it $309,876.78, plus interest and legal fees. However, since filing this appeal, appellant has filed for a Chapter 11 "reorganization" in bankruptcy. Because the bankruptcy laws require us to stay an assessment of costs against appellant until the estate is wound up, we dismiss without prejudice the appeal of the Government's claim against appellant. In addition, because appellant failed to file a certified claim with the contracting officer concerning whether respondent owes appellant $309,876.78, we dismiss that count for lack of jurisdiction. Background Respondent, on August 20, 1984, entered into Contract No. GS-09B-83349 with appellant to lease office space. In late 1985, the Internal Revenue Service began occupying most of appellant's office building, located at 1650 Mission Street in San Francisco, California. The lease contained a standard rent escalation clause, which required the parties to agree upon a "base year," then calculate all increases or decreases against that year, to find the rent due annually. Respondent's contracting officer, by letter dated February 27, 1992, told appellant that its audit of the lease payments from 1985 through 1992 revealed that: the bills for tax increases submitted by the Lessor pursuant to paragraph 32 of the above-referenced Government lease were incorrect in that, among other things, such bills incorrectly used calendar year ("CY") 1985 as the base year. Letter from James Draley to Richard Deringer (February 27, 1992). Respondent contended that the parties should use 1986 as the base year in assessing California and local real estate taxes. Since changing the base year changed respondent's tax liability under the escalation clause, respondent sought to recover $104,682.83 in overpayments from appellant. Count I of this appeal contests that claim by the Government. Appellant's president on May 20, 1992, wrote to respondent's contracting officer and noted that: "as of today's date the government owes our partnership $309,876.78, plus accrued interest," as part of the property tax pass-through for 1988 through 1991. Letter from Richard Deringer to James Draley (May 20, 1992). Appellant's president added that his firm had decided to file an appeal concerning the tax liability with the Board so that appellant could continue working with respondent to resolve the case. Appellant's letter contained no certification language of any kind. Before receiving a response to that letter, appellant on May 22, 1992, sent the Board a notice of appeal of the "final decision of Mr. James Draley." In this appeal, appellant seeks a cash award of $309,876.78, plus 18% interest from the date it billed the Government, and legal fees of approximately $25,000. Meanwhile, the Swiss Bank Corporation at the end of 1991 moved to foreclose on the San Francisco office building, and appellant was placed into receivership on December 6, 1991. On July 10, 1992, appellant filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the Northern District of California. Discussion The federal bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. 362 (a)(1) (1988)[foot #] 1, stays recovery of claims against a bankruptcy estate while the Court, trustee, and receiver wind up the affairs of the estate. The stay provision applies to an appeal of a Government claim at the Board, which is an action that may well result in a judgment against appellant. Kroy Inc., GSBCA 10619, 90-3 BCA 23,182. Van Ness's appeal of respondent's claim for $104,682.83 is just such a case. Accordingly, we grant respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal of the $104,682.83 assessment. The appeal is dismissed without prejudice, subject to reinstatement within 60 days after the conclusion of the federal bankruptcy proceedings in California. Next, we examine appellant's claim for $309,876.78. The Contract Disputes Act requires a contractor to present each claim "against the government relating to a contract" to the contracting officer for decision. 41 U.S.C. 605(a) (1988). For claims over $50,000, the contractor must certify that the claim is made in good faith, that the supporting data is accurate and complete to the best of its knowledge and belief, and that the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the Government is liable. 41 U.S.C. 605(c)(1) (1988). Appellant here sent an informal letter to the contracting officer two days before sending its "appeal" to the Board. Appellant did not certify its "claim" or even wait to receive a final decision. See 41 U.S.C. 605(b). Our appellate authority has interpreted strictly the Act's requirement that parties present claims to the contracting officer before filing an appeal at the boards or the Claims Court. Neither the Government nor a contractor can bypass this "presentation" requirement merely by filing a counterclaim, as a party might in other federal litigation. Joseph Morton Co. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1273, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 176, 192-93, 645 F.2d 966, 976 (1981). In this case, until appellant presents a ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 1 The automatic stay provision, in pertinent part, states that: a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of - (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title. 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1). ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- properly certified claim, and gives the contracting officer a reasonable time to consider it, the Board lacks jurisdiction over this dispute and must dismiss it. Diamond Envelope Corp., GSBCA 10752, 91-3 BCA 24,138, at 120,791; Roubin & Janeiro, Inc., GSBCA 6042, 82-2 BCA 15,802, at 78,262 (In drafting CDA, Congress intended contracting officers to decide claims drafted with same precision as those which eventually would come before boards of contract appeals and courts). Decision For the reasons stated above, we DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE appellant's appeal of respondent's assessment of $104,682.83. Appellant may reinstate the case within 60 days after the conclusion of its bankruptcy proceedings. We also DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION appellant's claim for $309,876.78. _____________________________ ROBERT W. PARKER Board Judge We concur: _____________________________ _____________________________ CATHERINE B. HYATT MARY ELLEN COSTER WILLIAMS Board Judge Board Judge