GRANTED IN PART: July 27, 1992 GSBCA 10902-C(7347), 10903-C(7379), 10904-C(7571), 10978-C(7425), 10979-C(7426), 10980-C(7427) SPECTRUM LEASING CORPORATION, Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Michael C. Montavon, P.C., Fairfax, VA, counsel for Appellant. Stuart I. Young and Michael D. Tully, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges LaBELLA, BORWICK, and NEILL. NEILL, Board Judge. On October 10, 1990, Spectrum Leasing Corporation (Spectrum or appellant) applied, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504 (1988), to recover fees and expenses incurred during its appeals of a series of contracting officer decisions. These six appeals, which were consolidated by the Board, arose from the partial termination for default (GSBCA 7347) and subsequent full termination for default (GSBCA 7379) of a contract awarded to Spectrum for the supply of terminal systems and related software that would constitute one portion of a data communications network to be used by the Veterans Administration. GSBCA 7425-7427 involved claims by appellant for funds offset by respondent as assessments of liquidated damages for alleged performance delays by Spectrum prior to contract termination. Lastly, GSBCA 7571 involved respondent's claim for reimbursement of payments to Spectrum prior to termination for hardware, software, and maintenance, and for software allegedly never delivered. On May 11, 1990, we granted all six appeals, Spectrum Leasing Corp., GSBCA 7347, et al., 90-3 BCA 22,984 (the appeals). Because our decision addressed only issues relating to entitlement, we retained GSBCA 7425-7427 for purposes of resolving the remaining questions regarding quantum. The Board, in granting the appeals, directed the parties to confer among themselves on these questions and to report back regarding their efforts to resolve them. The claims in question were in excess of $2,000,000. They covered the costs of hardware, maintenance, and software integration support provided to the Government by Spectrum. Payment of these costs had been withheld by the Government pursuant to the liquidated damages provision of the contract. During the months which followed, the parties provided the Board with status reports on the progress of their discussions. However, in January 1991, counsel informed the Board that specific legal questions had arisen with regard to these claims. Shortly thereafter, the Government moved to dismiss all remaining quantum issues. After the issues raised by the Government had been fully briefed, the Board issued a decision denying the Government's motion and urged the parties to resume their discussions. Spectrum Leasing Corp., GSBCA 7425, et al., 92-1 BCA 24,394 (1991). Thereafter, the parties resumed settlement discussions. On March 18, 1992, the parties submitted a joint motion to dismiss which advised the Board that they had reached agreement on the quantum in issue. On April 6, in accordance with the request of the parties, we dismissed the three remaining appeals. The total amount sought by Spectrum in its initial EAJA application in October 1990 was $396,414.85. The claim was divided in this way: $364,152 in attorney fees; $22,876.60 in expenses incurred by the attorneys, including $22,098 for paralegal services and $778.60 for lodging during hearing; $2,625 in consulting fees and expenses; and $6,761.25 in transcript costs. After filing its initial application, Spectrum filed a supplement requesting reimbursement of an additional $2,047.50 in attorney fees. This represented 27.3 hours, at $75 per hour, spent by counsel in replying to Respondent's Opposition to Appellant's Application under the EAJA (Respondent's Opposition). Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Position Concerning Appellant's Application under the EAJA (Reply Brief), Supplementary Affidavit of Michael C. Montavon (February 15, 1991). On February 28, 1992, Spectrum filed a second supplement to its pending EAJA application request. This supplement sought an additional $10,965 in attorney fees. This represented 146.2 hours of work, at $75 per hour, done by Spectrum's counsel in connection with the quantum claims of the remaining three appeals, including opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss these claims. GSA does not contest Spectrum's entitlement to be reimbursed. Respondent concedes, and we find, that Spectrum was the prevailing party, the position of the agency was not substantially justified, that no special circumstances make an award unjust, and that Spectrum meets the Act's size eligibility requirements. 5 U.S.C. 504 (1988). Instead, GSA disputes much of the quantum claimed in each of Spectrum's categories of cost. Discussion Attorney Fees Spectrum seeks attorneys fees for Michael C. Montavon, lead counsel in the appeals; Marvin Elster, co-counsel in the appeals and an employee of Spectrum; the law firm of Cotten, Day & Doyle, Spectrum's former counsel in the appeals; and the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, former co-counsel in the appeals. Michael C. Montavon Spectrum seeks reimbursement for 1,642.3 hours of Mr. Montavon's time at $75 per hour for a total of $123,172.50. This request is supported by two documents, the first being a computer printout showing time expended on the appeals between May 30 and August 21, 1985, and the second being a "Time Itemization" for time spent between October 2, 1985, and October 9, 1990; January 16, 1991, and February 15, 1991; and February 16, 1991, and February 26, 1992. According to Mr. Montavon's accompanying affidavits and further clarification provided in response to the Board's request, the time itemization is constructed from time slips which he kept during the course of the appeals and on a limited number of after-the-fact estimates as well. Of the total 1,642.3 hours claimed, 45.3 are said to be based upon estimates. These estimates are based on a review of contemporaneous file documentation evidencing time and effort expended on the case, but not actually recorded at the moment on a time slip. Respondent contests numerous charges of Mr. Montavon's time on the grounds that they are (1) not adequately explained, (2) not reasonably related to the appeals, or (3) excessive. Exhibit A-1 of Spectrum's application is a typical law office computer printout showing the time expended on the appeals by Mr. Montavon and others at a law firm in which he was a partner when he became Spectrum's counsel in the appeals. The various entries provide a statement of time spent, a brief description of the task(s) covered, the identity of the individual performing the task(s), his or her hourly rate, and the date of performance. Exhibit A-2, the time itemization, is similar in makeup -- as are the updates of it furnished with the supplemental submissions. The itemization does not state the lead attorney's hourly rate, but in an affidavit submitted by counsel, we are told that his normal billing rate in 1985 was $120 per hour. Since then it has risen to $150. This EAJA application, however, seeks reimbursement at a rate of $75 per hour. Respondent challenges a number of charges on the computer printout (Exhibit A-1) on the ground that they relate to fee arrangements between Mr. Montavon and Spectrum and guarantee of payment of fees rather than prosecution of the appeals. Respondent's Opposition at 6. Given the circumstances of these appeals, we consider it appropriate that counsel charge for the time spent in negotiating his fee arrangement and that Spectrum be reimbursed for this cost. The fee arrangements eventually agreed to by appellant and Mr. Montavon were not typical and clearly took more time to negotiate than would usually be the case in retaining counsel. Mr. Montavon was not the original counsel for appellant. He entered the scene at a time when appellant was confronting rapidly mounting legal expenses and experiencing serious cash flow problems resulting from the Government's assessment of liquidated damages and termination of Spectrum's contract for default. The prolonged fee negotiations were dictated, therefore, by circumstances uniquely attributable to the Government's own actions. They were an essential prerequisite to appellant's continual representation by counsel. As such, we find them closely related to the continue prosecution of appellant's claims and, therefore, reimbursable. Respondent challenges other charges in the computer printout (Exhibit A-1) and in the time itemization (Exhibit A-2) and updates of it filed with the supplemental submissions. Respondent contends that entries such as "review documents" and "telephone conference," without further identification of the subject matter, are insufficient to determine whether the charges are necessary and reasonable. The EAJA expressly requires applicants to provide "an itemized statement from any attorney, agent, or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed." 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(2) (1988). Our appellate authority has explained that pursuant to this requirement, applicants are expected to state the exact time spent on a case, by whom, their status, and usual billing rates. "Only by knowing the specific task performed can the reasonableness of the number of hours required for any individual item be judged." Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. United States, 825 F.2d 403, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Beta Systems, Inc. v. United States, 866 F.2d 1404, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (court accepts "typical billing records showing time and charges, a description of the work done, and by whom"). We find that Mr. Montavon's time itemization in Exhibits A -1, A-2, and his supplements to the same do, with the one exception noted in this opinion, meet the requirements of the EAJA as interpreted by our appellate authority. We are not troubled by the brevity of some of these entries. Mr. Montavon has confirmed that all entries relate to the litigation of the appeals in question. Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Appellant's Supplementary Application at 2. Furthermore, the terse entries criticized by respondent often cover time-periods of short duration. We see no reason why counsel should be expected to provide an extensive description of a task which is clearly related to the litigation but of short duration. As to the use of an entry such as "reviewed documents," this too, under the circumstances of this case, appears to us to be reasonable. The amount of documentation associated with these appeals was considerable. The amount of time expended in document review does not appear to us to have been excessive given the volume of material involved. Finally, the entries based on estimates appear to us to be reliable reconstructions, based as they are on an analysis of contemporary file documentation evidencing the specific work done. Certainly, with the contemporaneous work product in hand, counsel should be capable of estimating accurately the time expended. Respondent also questions the time spent by Mr. Montavon during the hearing for these appeals, particularly numerous days where he billed eighteen and twenty-hour days. Respondent questions whether these amounts are excessive and whether Mr. Montavon's efforts alone are reflected in the time charges. Respondent's Opposition at 6-7. In response, Mr. Montavon explains that these charges are for his time alone, and that extraordinarily long days were required during the hearing in order to be totally prepared. He claims to have made this "all out" effort because the economic viability of his client was at stake in these appeals. Reply Brief at 12-13. We find his explanation persuasive and allow the charges. Respondent also challenges much of the time claimed after Spectrum's reply brief was filed, but before the Board's decision was issued on entitlement. With the exception of activities which are specifically described as relating to the status of the appeals or involving contacts with Board staff regarding the cases, respondent questions all charges between November 2, 1986, approximately two months after Spectrum's reply brief was filed, and May 14, 1990, three days after the Board issued its decision. Respondent argues that, since the record was closed, these charges could not have been reasonably calculated to have an impact on the appeals and are, therefore, excessive. Respondent's Opposition at 7. Respondent also specifically objects to claims for time spent on congressional correspondence relating to the appeals. In general, we agree with respondent that it is not always clear from the descriptions given why Mr. Montavon was spending additional time on the appeals after the record was closed on the issue of entitlement. EAJA Application, Exhibit A-2 at 11-16. When, from the description of the activity, it is clear that Mr. Montavon was conferring with opposing counsel or conferring with the Board or others regarding the status of the appeals, we allow the charge, as generally does respondent. However, during the interval of time between closing the record on entitlement and issuance of the Board's decision, description of an activity as a "letter" or a "telephone conference" or a "conference" is insufficient for us to determine that these were reasonable and necessary charges. We also do not consider that the time spent on congressional correspondence was sufficiently related to the actual litigation of these appeals to justify reimbursement. Accordingly, we exclude 34.2 hours of Mr. Montavon's time during the period November 3, 1986, through May 14, 1991, at $75 per hour for a total disallowance of $2,565. Appellant's supplemental submission seeks compensation for time spent by Mr. Montavon negotiating with counsel for Fidelity Bank (Fidelity). This bank was the successor to the Southeast National Bank of Pennsylvania, the financial institution to which appellant assigned monies due under its contract with GSA in 1983. Appellant and Fidelity had been involved in litigation with each other. It was settled, however, in September 1986. Under the terms of the settlement, any amounts found due as a result of the appeals before the Board were to be paid jointly to Fidelity and appellant. Shortly after the Board rendered its decision on these appeals, however, GSA received conflicting advice from appellant and from Fidelity as to the party to whom payment should be made. In order to avoid a potential dispute over which party had entitlement to unpaid invoice amounts, appellant, GSA, and Fidelity entered into a settlement agreement specifying precisely how all unpaid monies were to be disbursed. See Respondent's Opposition to Appellant's Supplementary Application under the EAJA (Respondent's Opposition to Second Supplement) at 4-6. Respondent contends that time spent by Mr. Montavon dealing with counsel for Fidelity should not be compensable under the EAJA since these charges relate primarily to settlement of a private disagreement relating to the proper method of repaying Fidelity's loan to appellant. Id. at 6. Counsel for Spectrum replies that the three-way settlement was done precisely in order to accommodate concerns which GSA had regarding the resolution of the quantum issues in the three remaining appeals in a trouble- free and definitive fashion. Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Appellant's Supplementary Application at 3. We find the claim for time spent by appellant's counsel dealing with Fidelity's counsel is related to the appeals in question and, therefore, compensable. Although not a party to the dispute between appellant and GSA, Fidelity's interests, as an assignee under the contract, were closely intertwined with those of the disputants. Given the unique history of these disputes, involvement of Fidelity in the final settlement was undoubtedly a wise move and, most probably, essential in order to effect a final settlement of the remaining three appeals. Appellant's second supplement also contains entries for time Mr. Montavon spent conferring with an associate retained to prepare Spectrum's termination for convenience claim. Respondent objects to these entries on the grounds that any termination for convenience (T/for/C) claim is distinct from those claims which are the subject of the three remaining appeals. See Respondent's Opposition to Second Supplement at 2-4. Counsel for Spectrum freely admits that the T/for/C claim is a separate matter. However, he explains that there has been some inevitable commingling of the settlement efforts and the preparation of Spectrum's T/for/C claim. In recognition of this fact, and in an effort to eliminate claims for any time spent on the T/for/C issues, counsel has reduced, by what he deems to be an appropriate percentage, time entries which relate to both. We find counsel's approach in this regard both practical and credible. We see no reason to deny compensation for these entries as adjusted by counsel. Marvin Elster Spectrum seeks reimbursement for 2,224.2 hours of Mr. Elster's time at $75 per hour for a total of $166,815. Alternatively, Spectrum seeks compensation for the hours that Mr. Elster was its employee at his "fully allocated cost." EAJA Application at 3. Mr. Elster's affidavit lists his dates of employment and his activities in connection with the appeals. For the period April 25, 1984, through September 30, 1985, he describes his activities generally, without an hourly itemization. For the period October 5, 1985, through December 11, 1987, however, he describes his activities with considerably more detail. His reconstructed itemization of time spent during this period is derived in great part from the itemized list submitted by Mr. Montavon. EAJA Application, Exhibit B, Affidavit of Marvin Elster (October 9, 1990). At the end of Mr. Elster's time estimate is an entry for 500 hours said to have been expended during the period of April 1 to July 31, 1986, for: "Legal research; review Government briefs; review, edit, drafts of Spectrum briefs." Respondent objects to all of Mr. Elster's time because the hours are based on "after-the-fact" estimates and are "virtually all duplicative and excessive." Respondent's Opposition at 9. Respondent further contends that, since the documentary support for Mr. Elster's time is derived from Mr. Montavon's records, "virtually all instances where these two attorneys worked together must be viewed as entailing either unnecessary or duplicative work." Id. at 11. Respondent rejects all of the hours from April 25, 1984, through September 30, 1985, on the basis of no hourly itemization of activities. We agree that the general listing of time spent from April 25, 1984, through September 30, 1985, is unsatisfactory in that it lacks the specificity necessary to determine the reasonableness of the time claimed. We disagree, however, with respondent's contention that the specifically itemized work of Mr. Elster covering the period of October 5, 1985, through December 11, 1987, was virtually unnecessary or duplicative of that performed by Mr. Montavon. From the record of these appeals as well as the sworn statements of both Mr. Montavon and Mr. Elster, it is clear that both men worked in unquestionably close collaboration with each other during pretrial discovery, trial, and posthearing briefing. The litigation of all these appeals was complex and involved more than one attorney on either side. Furthermore, Mr. Elster's presence on the litigation team provided an element of continuity which was particularly critical to appellant in view of its need to change outside counsel on two separate occasions during the period of dispute. See EAJA Application, Exhibit B, Affidavit of Marvin Elster (October 9, 1990); Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Reply Brief, Supplementary Affidavit of Michael C. Montavon (February 15, 1991). Given the close collaborative relationship known to have existed in this case between Mr. Elster and Mr. Montavon, therefore, Mr. Elster's heavy reliance on the contemporaneous records of Mr. Montavon to reconstruct his own itemized listing of time is well placed. This reliance plus our own knowledge of the complexity of this case and particularly the extensive posthearing briefing process satisfy us that the specific hours listed by Mr. Elster for the period of October 5, 1985, through December 11, 1987, are both realistic and reasonable for the tasks involved. The hourly rate applicable to Mr. Elster's time likewise constitutes a point of disagreement between the parties. Appellant has sought reimbursement at the maximum allowable market rate of $75. In an initial opposition to appellant's petition, respondent noted the absence of any justification for this amount as well as the absence of any indication of what Mr. Elster's actual rate of compensation was.[foot #] 1 Respondent's Opposition at 10. In this circuit it is well established that in cases such as this, the calculation of fees for in-house counsel is based on the use of a cost-based standard rather than a private firm market rate standard. The objection to the use of a market rate is that this allows a nonlegal business corporation to use the services of in-house counsel and reap a profit therefrom. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988); accord Devine v. National Treasury Employees Union, 805 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Goodrich v. Department of the Navy, 733 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984); National Treasury Employees Union v. Department of the Treasury, 656 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1981). We hold, therefore, that appellant is entitled to recover for the time listed by Mr. Elster for the period of October 5, 1985, through December 11, 1987, but at a rate based solely upon his actual cost to the company. The hourly rates supplied by appellant in this case for the period in question are $26.44 (October 1 through December 31, 1985) and $30.41 (January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1987). We, therefore, find appellant entitled to a total of $32,939.23 for time expended by Mr. Elster (namely 253 hours @ 26.44 and 863.2 hours @ 30.41). Cotten, Day & Doyle Spectrum seeks reimbursement of $80,082 in attorney fees paid to the law firm of Cotten, Day & Doyle (CDD), which provided legal services to Spectrum from February 1983 through January 1985, and was its former counsel in the appeals. The request is supported by copies of monthly invoices which provide a dollar figure representing total attorney time ("subtotal of professional services") and a breakdown of disbursements for items such as photocopying, telephone charges, and postage. The bills do indicate the nature of the services provided, but provide no information regarding the amount of time spent providing the services, the identity of the individual attorney who provided the service, or the rate charged by that attorney. EAJA Application, Exhibit C. ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 1 In replying to respondent's objection, appellant continues to contend that it is entitled to recovery the cost of Mr. Elster's time at the maximum allowable market rate but has, nonetheless, provided figures on the cost of employing Mr. Elster in the event the Board concludes that this is the more appropriate measure for recovery. See Appellant's Reply to ___ Respondent's Reply Brief, Affidavit of Linda J. Paskal (February 15, 1991). ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- In preparing this application, Spectrum sought supporting documentation from CDD's successor firm, Doyle, Simmons & Bachman. Correspondence in appellant's application indicates that the firm was concerned over the costs which would be associated with searching for this documentation and reconstructing individual attorney's records. Spectrum was asked to pay these costs. In addition, a quick preliminary search by the firm indicated that much of the raw material needed for this effort was probably no longer available. Id., Exhibit D, letters from Doyle, Simmons & Bachman to Spectrum dated Sept. 17 and Oct. 4, 1990. Spectrum apparently chose not to pursue this matter. Instead, using invoices previously received from CDD, it estimated the number of hours that CDD spent on the appeals. It did this by dividing the total amounts charged per month by what it contends was the average hourly rates of the firm's attorneys at that time, namely $150. Since not all the work done related to the appeals which are the subject of this application, Spectrum made further estimates, namely, the percentage of the total time, thus derived, which related to the GSA litigation. See EAJA Application at 3-4. Spectrum estimates that from February 1983 through April 1984, fifty percent of CDD's bills, or $108,498.67, were for the appeals. Using the estimated hourly billing rate of $150, that amounts to approximately 723 hours expended in the appeals. Applying this figure to the EAJA cap of $75 per hour, Spectrum claims $54,225. For the period May 1984 through March 1985, Spectrum states that all of the legal services provided by CDD related to the appeals. Applying the same average hourly billing rate of $150 per hour, capped at $75 per hour, to an estimated total time expenditure of 345 hours, Spectrum seeks a total of $25,857 for those hours. Respondent's threshold objection to a portion of CDD's fees is well taken. Charges for work performed during February through mid-September 1983 are not reimbursable since the contracting officer did not issue the first final decision in the appeals until September 14, 1983. The EAJA provides that an agency may award fees and expenses incurred in connection with an "adversary adjudication," which, in cases such as this, is a board appeal following a contracting officer's final decision. 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)(ii) (1988). Consequently, there can be no recovery for time expended by counsel prior to the issuance of the contracting officer's decision. See Levernier Constr., Inc. v. United States, 947 F.2d 497, 502 (at its earliest, EAJA coverage may begin after the decision of and in pursuit of an appeal from the decision of a contracting officer); American Power, GSBCA 10558-C(8752) 91-2 BCA at 119,046. Spectrum cannot, therefore, recover the amount of CDD's fees attributable to February through mid-September 1983. In a related vein, respondent challenges the fees charged from October through December 1983 on the basis that only one appeal had been filed and the notice of appeal was the only document filed with the Board. In fact, two other appeals were filed on December 12 and 22, respectively. Spectrum Leasing, 90-3 BCA at 115,431-32, Findings 137, 143.[foot #] 2 GSA also questions why the charges claimed for the period July 1983 through April 1984 are more than twice the charges claimed for the period May 1984 through January 1985 -- which period follows the issuance of all final decisions and presumably includes the intense preparation of the case for trial. Respondent suggests that many of the charges from the earlier period are for work unrelated to the appeals and are therefore not compensable. GSA's fundamental objection to the claim for time expended by CDD, however, is that there is: (1) no affidavit from CDD to support the charges; (2) no specific description of the services performed by each attorney; and (3) no itemization of the charges which includes the actual time expended and the hourly rate charged by each attorney. Respondent's Opposition at 11-13. We agree. Upon review of the documentation submitted, we find that this portion of appellant's claim is substantially deficient in that it lacks the specificity requisite for a claim pursuant to the EAJA. Indeed, given the severity of the deficiency, we do not consider that this claim, as presented, is entitled to even a discretionary award of a lesser amount rather than total rejection. It is well established in this circuit that EAJA claimants are expected to state, as a prerequisite to relief under the Act, the exact time spent on a case, by whom, the status of this person, and the person's usual billing rates. In addition, claims for attorney fees must be based on contemporaneous records, which are considered essential to support an EAJA claim. See Beta Systems, Inc., 866 F.2d 1404, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Owen v. United States, 861 F.2d 1273, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Naporano Iron & Metal Co., 825 F.2d 403, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1987).[foot #] 3 If a portion of an EAJA application fails to meet these critical requirements, it simply does not qualify for any relief ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 2 Final decisions were rendered in the appeals on the following dates: 7347 - Sept. 13, 1983; 7379 - Dec. 22, 1983; 7425 - Dec. 12, 1983; 7246 & 7427 - Jan. 16, 1984; 7571 - May 30, 1984. Spectrum Leasing, 90-3 BCA 24,394, Findings 115, ________________ 137, 143, 144, 148. [foot #] 3 We also note that our appellate authority has rejected the calculation method relied upon by appellant. See ___ Naporano Iron & Metal Co., 825 F.2d 403, 404 (claim denied when _________________________ fees were calculated by dividing the total fee request by an average hourly rate that was a close approximation to the actual hourly rates). ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- under the statute. In such cases, we consider that this portion of the claim falls outside the limits of our discretion to grant any relief. As our appellate authority recently had occasion to explain: Following the general rule established in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), this court typically reviews a trial court's award of fees and expenses under the EAJA for an abuse of discretion. However, before a trial judge may exercise that discretion by interpreting the facts in light of the statutory standard, he or she must show that the case properly falls within the statute's framework. Failure to correctly make this showing is legal error, which we review de novo. Levernier, 947 F.2d at 499. Appellant's failure to include in its claim for the time expended by CDD the detail required by statute places the claim outside the statute's framework and, therefore, beyond any partial relief which we, in our discretion, might wish to grant. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman Spectrum seeks reimbursement of $7,050 in attorney fees paid to the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman (Fried Frank), which provided legal services to Spectrum from April through November 1984. The request is supported by copies of monthly invoices which follow a summary-type format. Each invoice sets forth a total dollar amount due for services rendered and disbursements made for the "GSA Default." Similar totals are also given for services and disbursements for other unrelated matters as well. There is no indication of the specific service rendered, the individual attorney rendering it, the amount of time involved, or the rate charged by the attorney in question. Indeed, appellant has calculated the number of hours spent by dividing the dollar totals for services by an average rate of $150. No affidavit has been provided by the firm indicating what its actual rates were at the time in question. Using this alleged $150 hourly billing rate to divide a total of $14,200.31 billed by Fried Frank for work on the GSA default, Spectrum concludes that Fried Frank spent approximately 94 hours on the appeals. Applying the hourly EAJA cap of $75 per hour, Spectrum seeks a total of $7,050 for those hours. As we have already pointed out with regard to a similar claim made for time expended by the firm of Cotton, Day & Doyle, we find the supporting documentation for this portion of appellant's application likewise substantially deficient. It clearly lacks the specificity required by statute and case law regarding the service actually provided, the time expended, the identity of the attorneys involved and their respective rates. This portion of appellant's application is, therefore, denied in its entirety. In summary, we award Spectrum $153,546.73 in attorney fees, computed as follows: Attorney/Firm Amount Sought Disallowed Allowed Montavon $123,172.50 $ 2,565.00 $120,607.50 Elster 166,815.00 133,875.77 32,939.23 CDD 80,082.00 80,082.00 0 Fried Frank 7,050.00 7,050.00 0 Expenses Incurred By Attorneys The EAJA permits recovery of certain listed "fees and other expenses." 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A) (1988). That listing is not exclusive, and the Federal Circuit has held that the EAJA permits the award of those reasonable and necessary expenses of an attorney incurred or paid in preparation for trial of the specific case before the court, which expenses are those customarily charged to the client where the case is tried. Oliveira v. United States, 827 F.2d 735, 744 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Spectrum seeks reimbursement for the time expended by Mr. Montavon's paralegal and for his lodging during the hearing. Paralegal Fees Spectrum seeks compensation for 552.45 hours of paralegal time at $40 per hour for a total of $22,098. EAJA Application at 2, Exhibit A-3. According to Mr. Montavon's affidavit, the paralegal assisting him with the appeals worked as an independent contractor for the month of October 1985 at the rate of $12.50 per hour, and then became his employee. Forty dollars per hour was the paralegal's market rate, i.e., the rate at which Spectrum was billed for her time. As an employee, the paralegal worked exclusively on the appeals; she did not keep time slips, but rather kept track of the total hours worked. Mr. Montavon retained the original payroll records showing the hours that she worked. The affidavit also describes the type of work the paralegal performed, namely collecting, organizing, and summarizing documents pertaining to the appeals. Affidavit of Michael C. Montavon (Montavon Affidavit) (October 10, 1990) at 2 ( 7). Respondent objects to all of the fees claimed for paralegal work in Exhibit A-3 on the grounds that the work performed is not described and no contemporaneous time records support the charges. Respondent also contends that, were the time to be compensable, it should be at the paralegal's "salary rate" rather than the rate at which her services were billed to Spectrum. Respondent's Opposition at 8. Since Spectrum prevailed on all appeals, there is no need for us to examine in special detail the activity of Mr. Montavon's paralegal. Since she is said to have worked full time on these appeals, we are satisfied with the general description of her work given in Mr. Montavon's affidavit. We likewise have no reason to question the reliability of Mr. Montavon's statement that he compiled the paralegal's hours from original payroll records. We consider this to be a reliable contemporaneous source. With regard to the rate at which paralegal time should be recovered, we note that the Supreme Court, for the purposes of the fee-shifting provision of the Civil Rights Act, has concluded that "reasonable attorney fees" includes fees for the services of paralegals and law clerks billed at market rate and not merely at the cost to the attorney provided this is the prevailing practice in the community. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1989). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized that paralegal fees can be recovered through an EAJA application. Kunz Construction Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 431, 439-40, aff'd mem., 899 F.2d 1227 (1990). We see no reason why the reasoning of Jenkins should not apply to such claims. Respondent has offered nothing for the record which suggests that the prevailing practice in the metropolitan Washington area is for attorneys not to bill for paralegal services at the going market rate. On the contrary, in processing multiple cost claims in conjunction with the exercise of our protest jurisdiction, we are left with the understanding that the prevailing practice in this area is, in fact, to bill at market rates. We, therefore, grant the entire claim for $22,098. Lodging In its initial application, Spectrum sought $778.60 for Mr. Montavon's lodging and related charges during the hearing in the appeals. EAJA Application at 5-6. Of that amount, respondent challenged $110.15, comprising parking fees, phone calls, postage, and copying charges. Respondent's Opposition at 17-18. In response, Spectrum elected not to contest those deductions and reduced its claim to $668.45. Reply Brief at 24. Reasonable travel expenses necessarily incurred by an attorney in preparation for a case are reimbursable under the EAJA as costs directly related to the litigation. Warwick Holding Co., GSBCA 8459-C(5070), et al., 88-3 BCA 21,114, at 106,597. Spectrum, therefore, may recover $668.45. Consulting Fees and Transcript Costs Spectrum seeks reimbursement of consulting fees for Frederick J. Lees and Ralph Nash. EAJA Application at 5. Both Mr. Lees and Mr. Nash were professors of law at the George Washington University at the time they were consulted. Reply Brief at 23-24. The EAJA provides that reimbursement may be made for "the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project found . . . to be necessary for the presentation of the party's case." 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (1988). Professor Lees billed Spectrum for thirty-three hours of legal research and consultation services in connection with the appeals, at a rate of $75 per hour, for a total of $2,475. This included a review of Spectrum's draft post-hearing brief. EAJA Application, Exhibit F. For Professor Nash's time, Spectrum has submitted only a copy of a "Miscellaneous Expense Voucher" which indicated that Ralph Nash was the payee and stated: "Consulting services on GSA/VA case. Expect to utilize 2-4 hours of Nash's time @ $150. Need check for 2 hours ($300) to take to meeting on Fri. 6/6/86 -- balance, if any, to be paid following week." EAJA Application, Exhibit G. Spectrum, in seeking reimbursement for two hours of consultation with Professor Nash, has applied the hourly EAJA cap of $75 and asks to recover $150 of the $300 paid to him. The requirement that tasks associated with attorney hourly charges be specified has been held to apply equally to consultants. Levernier Construction, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 683, 691 (1990), modified on reconsideration, 22 Cl. Ct. 247 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 947 F.2d 497 (Fed. Cir. 1991); cf. American Power, 91-2 BCA at 119,052 (consultants' work product and its use described by the Board). In its reply, Spectrum states that both Professors Nash and Lees were consulted for their "unquestioned expertise and insight into the legal issues which were involved in [the appeals]." Reply Brief at 24. We find the information contained in Professor Lees' statements to be sufficiently descriptive of the services rendered. As to the two-hour consultation with Professor Nash, we likewise find the contemporaneous voucher which states his hourly rate and the scope of the discussion with him to be adequate for purposes of determining the reasonableness of the charge. We, therefore, grant both claims. Transcripts Spectrum also seeks reimbursement of $6,761.25 in transcript costs. EAJA Application, Exhibits I, J. These costs are adequately documented by invoices and checks and are unopposed by respondent. The cost of transcripts is recoverable as an expense directly related to the litigation, and is therefore recoverable. American Power, 91-2 BCA at 119,049. We award Spectrum the amount claimed for transcript costs. Summary In the following table, we show the amount for which Spectrum has claimed reimbursement, and the amount that we have awarded: Reimbursement Reimbursement claimed awarded Attorney fees $377,119.50 $153,546.73 Paralegal fees 22,098.00 22,098.00 Lodging 668.45 668.45 Consultants' fees 2,625.00 2,625.00 Transcript costs 6,761.25 6,761.25 Total $409,272.20 $185,699.43 Decision Spectrum's application under the EAJA for reimbursement of attorney fees and other costs involved in the prosecution of the appeals is GRANTED IN PART. The applicant is awarded $185,699.43. _______________________ EDWIN B. NEILL Board Judge We concur: ______________________ _______________________ VINCENT A. LaBELLA ANTHONY S. BORWICK Board Judge Board Judge